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Abstract
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for \sponsored-link" positions
on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as
coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about
rm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding,
and the welfare benets of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve
prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.
JEL Classication No.: D44, L86, M37
1 Introduction
Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft allocate the small \sponsored links" at the top and on
the right side of their search engine results via similar auction mechanisms. Sponsored-link
auctions have quickly become one of the more practically important topics in the economics
of auctions, as annual revenues now surpass $10 billion. They have also quickly become
an important topic in the economics of advertising: they have driven the recent growth of
online advertising, which is having dramatic eects both on products that are now heavily
sold online and on the competing media that are suering in the competition for advertising
dollars.1 In this paper, we address issues of relevance to both elds by developing a model of
sponsored-link advertising that incorporates both standard auction-theoretic and two-sided
market considerations.
There has been a recent burst of academic papers on sponsored-search auctions spurred
both by the importance of the topic and by some very elegant results. This literature has
Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. E-mail: athey@fas.harvard.edu, gel-
lison@mit.edu. We thank Ben Edelman, Leslie Marx, John Morgan, Ilya Segal, Hal Varian, and various
seminar audiences for their comments and Eduardo Azevedo, Eric Budish, Stephanie Hurder, Scott Komin-
ers, and Dmitry Taubinsky for exceptional research assistance. This work was supported by NSF grants
SES-0550897 and SES-0351500 and the Toulouse Network for Information Technology.
1Online advertising revenues are projected to surpass both radio and newspaper advertising revenues by
the end of 2010.
1coined the term \position auctions" to describe the particular multi-good auction in which
per-click bidding is used to auction o n asymmetric objects with unidimensional bids.2 A
striking result, derived in Aggarwal, Goel, and Motwani (2006), Edelman, Ostrovsky, and
Schwarz (2007), and Varian (2007), is that the generalized second price (GSP) position
auction in which the kth highest bidder wins the kth slot and pays the k + 1st highest
bid is not equivalent to the VCG mechanism and thus does not induce truthful bidding,
but nonetheless results in the same revenue as the VCG mechanism in an interesting class
of environments. A number of subsequent papers have extended the analyses in various
important dimensions such as allowing for reserve prices, the use of weights to account
for asymmetric click-through rates, and considering more general relationships between
positions and click-through rates.3
Most of the literature, however, is squarely auction-focused and continues to abstract
away from the fact that the \objects" being auctioned are advertisements.4 We feel that
this is an important omission because when the value of a link is due to consumers' clicking
on the links and making purchases, it is natural to assume that consumer behavior and link
values will be aected by the process by which links are selected for display. In this paper,
we develop this line of analysis. By incorporating consumers into our model, we are able
to answer questions about how the design of the advertising auction marketplace aects
overall welfare, as well as the division of surplus between consumers, search engines, and
advertisers. Our framework allows us to provide new insights about reserve prices policies,
click-through weighting, fostering product diversity, advertisers' incentives to write accurate
ad text, \search-diverting"aggregators, dierent payment schemes (e.g. pay per click vs.
pay per action), and the possiblility of using multi-stage auction mechanisms.
Section 2 of the paper presents our base model. The most important assumptions are
that advertisers dier in quality (with high quality rms being more likely to meet each
consumer's need), that consumers incur costs of clicking on ads, and that consumers act
rationally in deciding how many ads to click on and in what order.
2See Ausubel and Cramton (2004) and Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg (2007), for broader discussions
of multi-good auctions.
3See, among many others, Edelman and Schwarz (2006) on reserve prices, Lehaie (2006), Liu and Chen
(2006), and Liu, Chen and Whinston (2009) on click-weights, and Borgers, Cox, Pesendorfer, and Petricek
(2006) and Aggarwal, Feldman, Muthukrishnan, and Pal (2008) on alternate click-position relationships.
4As discussed below, Chen and He (2006) is a noteworthy early exception { they develop a model with
optimal consumer search and note that the fact that auctions lead to a sorting of advertisers by quality can
rationalize top-down search and be a channel through which sponsored link auctions contribute to social
welfare. Xu, Chen, and Whinston (2008) and White (2008) are more recent papers examining two-sided
market considerations.
2Section 3 presents some basic results on search, welfare, and the economic role of spon-
sored search advertising. We characterize optimal consumer search strategies. We note
that a search engine that presents sponsored links should be thought of as an information
intermediary that contributes to welfare by providing information (in the form of an or-
dered list) that allows consumers to search more eciently. And present some calculations
that quantify the welfare benets.
Section 4 contains our equilibrium analysis of the sponsored-link auction. Because the
value of being in any given position on the search screen depends on the qualities of all
of the other advertisers, the auction is no longer a private-values model and hence does
not t within the framework of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (EOS) (2007). We note,
however, that the common value elements of our model are perhaps surprisingly easy to
deal with { the analysis of EOS can be adapted with only minor modications. We are
able to provide explicit formulas describing a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
monotone bidding functions and discuss a number of properties of the equilibrium.
We then turn to auction-design questions. These are obviously of practical interest
to rms conducting sponsored-link auctions and to policy-makers who must interpret the
actions being taken in what is a highly concentrated industry. We nd them interesting from
a theoretical perspective as well, because it is here that the fact that Google is auctioning
advertisements rather than generic objects brings up a host of new concerns. Any changes
to the rules for selecting ads will aect what consumers infer about the quality of each
displayed ad, which in turn aects the value of winning each of the prizes being auctioned.
Eects of this variety can substantially change the way one thinks about search engine
policies.
Our rst auction design section, Section 5, focuses on reserve-price policies. Recall that
in standard auctions with exogenous values, reserve prices raise revenue for the auctioneer,
but this comes at a welfare cost { some potential gains from trade are not realized. In
contrast, in our model, reserve prices can enhance total social surplus, and in some cases
can even be good for advertisers. The reason is that reserve prices may can enhance welfare
in two ways: they help consumers avoid some of the inecient search costs they incur when
clicking on low quality links; and they can increase the number of links that are examined
in equilibrium.5 The section also focuses on conicts (or the lack thereof) between the
preferences of consumers, advertisers, and the search engine. Indeed, our analysis begins
5In this respect, our model is related to that of Kamenica (2008) which develops a rational alternative
to \behavioral" explanations for why demand sometimes rises when consumers are presented with a smaller
choice set.
3with an observation that when consumer search costs are uniformly distributed (but other
aspects of the model are left quite general) there is a perfect alignment of consumer-optimal
and socially optimal policies. This observation turns out to be a nice way to bring out several
insights: we derive results on consumer and social welfare; we use it as a computational
tool; and we note that it also implies that there is an inherent conict between the search
engine and its advertisers { any departures from the socially optimal policy that increases
search engine prots must do so by reducing advertiser surplus. We also present a number
of results concerning what does and does not generalize to the case when consumer search
costs are drawn from general distributions.
Section 6 examines click-weighted auctions similar to those used by Google, Yahoo!
and Microsoft. Google's introduction of click-through weighting in 2002 is regarded as
an important competitive advantage and Yahoo!'s introduction of click-through weights
into its ranking algorithm in early 2007 (\Panama") was highly publicized as a critical
improvement.6 It is intuitive that weighting bids by click-through rates should improve
eciency { surplus is only generated when consumers click on links. EOS note briey
(at the end of section III) that their eciency result extends to establish the eciency of
click-weighted auctions when click-through rates are the product of a position eect and
an advertiser eect.7 Our analysis places some caveats on this conventional wisdom about
eciency. In the presence of search costs, we show that the click-weighted auction does
not necessarily generate the right selection of ads { general ads may be displayed when it
would be more ecient to display an ads that serve a narrower population segment well.
There can also be welfare losses when asymmetries in the click-through weights make the
ordering of the ads less informative about quality. Finally, we note that the introduction
of click-weighting can create incentives for rms to write misleading and overly broad text.
The intuition for the latter result is that even though rms pay per click, in a click-weighted
auction, rms that generate more clicks on average must pay less per click to maintain their
position, and so they have no incentive to economize on consumer clicks. The result is also
robust to the use of pay-per-action pricing models, so long as the auction is action-weighted.
Section 7 discusses a few more auction design topics: the extent to which search-
diverting sites decrease revenue; and how incorporating consumer uncertainty about search
6Eisenmann and Hermann (2006) report that Google's move was in part motivated by a desire for
improved ad relevance: \according to Google, this method ensured that users saw the most relevant ads
rst."
7Lehaie (2006), Liu and Chen (2006), and Liu, Chen, and Whinston (2009), note that while click-
weighting is ecient, a prot-maximizing search engine will typically want to choose dierent weights.
4engine quality leads to a strong negative impact of allowing irrelevant advertisers to pur-
chase sponsored links on click-through rates and consumer welfare.
As noted above, our paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature. Edelman, Os-
trovsky, and Schwarz (2007), Aggarwal, Goel, and Motwani (2006), and Varian (2007), all
contain versions of the result that the standard unweighted position auction (which EOS
call the generalized second price or GSP auction) is not equivalent to a VCG mechanism
but can yield the same outcome in equilibrium. Such results can be derived in the context
of a perfect information model under certain equilibrium selection conditions. EOS show
that the equivalence can also be derived in an incomplete information ascending bid auc-
tion, and that in this case the VCG-equivalent equilibrium is the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. The papers also note conditions under which the results would carry over to
click-weighted auctions.
We have already mentioned a number of papers that extend the analysis in various
dimensions. Edelman and Schwarz (2006) were the rst to analyze optimal reserve prices,
which is one of our main focuses. Our work departs from theirs in our consideration of
the feeedbacks between auction rules, consumer expectations, and the value of advertising
slots. Two other papers are noteworthy for considering more general click-through processes
and presenting empirical results. B orgers, Cox, Pesendorfer and Petricek (BCPP) (2007)
extend the standard model to allow click-through rates and value per click to vary across
positions in dierent ways for dierent advertisers and emphasize that there can be a great
multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes in a perfect information setting.8 Jeziorski and Segal
(2009) develop a model in which consumers have more general preferences across bundles
of ads and provide both reduced form empirical results relevant to our paper, e.g. noting
that consumers do not always search in a top-down manner and that clicks on lower ads are
aected by the quality of higher ads, and structural estimates of consumer utility parameters
Chen and He (2006) is most closely related to our paper. They had previously in-
troduced a model that is like ours in several respects. Advertisers are assumed to have
dierent valuations because they have dierent probabilities of meeting consumers' needs.
Consumers search optimally until their need is satised. They also include some desirable
elements which we do not include: they endogenize the prices advertisers charge consumers;
8Our model does not t in the BCPP framework either, however, because they maintain the assumption
that advertiser i's click-through rate in position j is independent of the characteristics of the other adver-
tisers. BCPP also contains an empirical analysis which includes methodological innovations and estimates
of how value-per-click changes with position in Yahoo! data.
5and allow rms to have dierent production costs.9 We are enthusiastic about these as-
sumptions as introducing important issues and think that the observations they make about
the basic economics of their model (and ours) are interesting and important: they note that
sponsored links provide a welfare benet by directing consumer search and making it more
ecient; further, they note that without some renement there will also be equilibria in
which consumers pay no attention to the order of sponsored links and the links are therefore
worthless.
Our work goes beyond theirs in several ways. They only consider what happens for one
particular realization of rm qualities, whereas we assume the qualities are independently
drawn from a distribution and examine an incomplete information game. They assume
that consumers know the (unordered) set of realized qualities, so there is no updating
about the quality of the set of advertisers as consumers move down the list. They have
no heterogeneity in consumer search costs and obviate the search duration problem by
assuming that search costs are such that all consumers will search all listed rms. As a
consequence, most of our paper addresses issues that don't come up in their framework.
They have no analog to our derivation of optimal consumer search strategies because their
consumers simply click on all sponsored links (if necessary). They have no analog to our
derivation of the equilibrium strategies in an asymmetric information bidding game { they
compute Nash equilibria of a game where rms know each others values. And they do not
discuss reserve prices or the many other auction design issues we consider. (Many of the
auction design questions hinge on how the design aects the information consumers get
about rm qualities and thereby inuences consumer search, which is not something that
comes up when search costs are such that all consumers view all ads.)
Several more recent papers have also examined issues that reect that search-engines
are auctioning advertisements. White (2008) builds on the two-sided markets literature
to examine motivations to distort the quality of organic search results. Xu, Chen, and
Whinston (2009) develop a model in which advertisers are also competing in prices for the
goods they are advertising and provide a number of interesting observations about how this
may interact with the willingness to bid for a higher position.
9As in Diamond (1971) the equilibrium turns out to be that all rms charge the monopoly price.
62 A Base Model
A continuum of consumers have a \need." They receive a benet of 1 if the need is met.
To identify rms able to meet the need they visit a search site. The search site displays M
sponsored links. Consumer j can click on any of these at cost sj. Consumers click optimally
until their need is met or until the expected benet from an additional click falls below sj.
We assume the sj have an atomless distribution G with support [0;1].
N advertisers wish to advertise on a website. Firm i has probability qi of meeting each
consumer's need, which is private information. We assume that all rms draw their qi
independently from a common distribution, F; which is atomless and has support [0;1].
Advertisers get a payo of 1 every time they meet a need.
Informally, we follow EOS in assuming that the search site conducts an ascending bid
auction for the M positions: if the advertisers drop out at per-click bids b1;:::;bN, the
search engine selects the advertisers with the M highest bids and lists them in order from
top to bottom. The kth highest bidder pays the k + 1st highest bid for each click it gets.10
To avoid some of the complications that arise in continuous time models, however, we
formalize the auction as a simpler M-stage game in which the rms are simply repeatedly
asked to name the price at which they will next drop out if no other rm has yet dropped
out.11 In the rst stage, which we call stage M + 1, the rms simultaneously submit bids
bM1;:::bMN 2 [0;1) specifying a per-click price they are willing to pay to be listed on
the screen. The N   M lowest bidders are eliminated.12 Write bM+1 for the highest bid
among the rms that have been eliminated. In remaining stages k, which we'll index by
the number of rms remaining, k 2 fM;M   1;:::;2g, the rms which have not yet been
eliminated simultaneously submit bids bkn 2 [bk+1;1). The rm with the single lowest bid
is assigned position k and eliminated from future bidding. We dene bk to be the bid of
this player. At the end of the auction, the rms in positions 1, 2, ..., M will make per-click
payments of b2;b3;:::;bM+1 for the clicks they receive.
Before proceeding, we pause to mention the main simplications incorporated in the
10Note that this model diers from the real-world auctions by Google, Yahoo!, and MSN in that it does
not weight bids by clickthrough weights. We discuss such weighted auctions in Section 6. We present
results rst for the unweighted auction because the environment is easier to analyze. It should also be an
approximation to real-world auctions in which dierences in click-through rates across rms are minor, e.g.
where the bidders are retailers with similar business models.
11Two examples of issues we avoid dealing with in this way are formalizing a clock-process in which rms
can react instantaneously to dropouts and specifying what happens if two or more rms never drop out.
See Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) for more on extensive form specications of multi-unit auctins.
12If two or more rms are tied for the M
th highest bid, we assume that the tie is broken randomly with
each tied rm being equally likely to be eliminated.
7baseline model. First, advertisers are symmetric except for their probability of meeting
a need: prot-per-action is the same for all rms, and we do not consider the pricing
problem for the advertiser. By focusing on the probability of meeting a need rather than
pricing, we focus attention on the case{which we believe is most common on search engines
(as opposed to price comparison sites){where search phrases are suciently broad that
many dierent user intentions correspond to the same search phrase, and so the rst-order
dierence among sites is whether they are even plausible candidates for the consumer's
needs. If we allowed for rms to set prices but required consumers to search to learn
prices, rms would have an incentive to set monopoly prices, following the logic of Diamond
(1971) and Chen and He (2006); thus, the main consequence of our simplication is the
symmetry assumption. Generalizing the model to allow for heterogeneous values conditional
on meeting the consumer's need would allow us to distinguish between the externality a
rm creates on others by being higher on the list, which is related to the probability of
meeting the need, and the value the rm gets from being in a position; we leave that for
future work.
Our baseline model assumes that advertisers receive no benet when consumers see their
ad but do not click on it. Incorporating such impression values (as in BCPP) places a wedge
between the externality created by a rm and its value to being in a given position. In
addition, consumers get no information about whether listed rms are more or less likely to
meet their needs from reading the text of their ads. In Section 6, we consider extensions of
our model where the ad text of rms is informative, leading to heteroeneous click-through
rates, and its accuracy is endogenous; we also consider the eect of advertiser value for
impressions in this context.
3 Consumer search and the economic role of sponsored-link
auctions
In this section we bring out the idea that search engines auctioning sponsored links are
information intermediaries and that one way in which they contribute to social welfare is
by making consumer search more ecient. We do so by characterizing consumer welfare
with sorted and unsorted lists. This section also contains important building blocks for
all of our analyses: an analysis of the Bayesian updating that occurs whenever consumers
nd that a particular link does not meet their needs; and a derivation of optimal search
strategies.
83.1 Consumer search and Bayesian updating
Suppose that advertisers' bids in the position auction are strictly monotone in q.13 Then, in
equilibrium the rms will be sorted so that the rm with the highest q is on top. Consumers
know this, so the expected utility from clicking on the top rm is the highest order statistic,
q1:N.14 Their expected payo for any addition clicks must be determined by Bayesian
updating: the fact that the rst website didn't meet their needs makes them reduce their
estimate of its quality and of all lower websites' qualities.
Let q1:N;:::;qN:N be the order statistics of the N rms' qualities and let z1;:::;zN be
Bernoulli random variables equal to one with these probabilities. Let  qk be the expected
quality of website k in a sorted list, given that the consumer has failed to fulll his need
from the rst k   1 advertisers:
 qk = E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0).
Proposition 1 If the rms are sorted by quality in equilibrium, then consumers follow a
top-down strategy: they start at the top and continue clicking until their need is met or
until the expected quality of the next website is below the search cost:  qk < s. The numbers
 qk are given by
 qk = E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0)
=
R 1
0 xfk:N(x)Probfz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0jqk:N = xgdx
R 1
0 fk:N(x)Probfz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0jqk:N = xgdx
A rm in position k will receive (1   q1:N)(1   qk 1:N)G( qk) clicks.
Proof: Consumers search in a top-down manner because the likelihood of that a site
meets a consumer's need is consumer-independent, and hence maximized for each consumer
at the site with the highest q. A consumer searches the kth site if and only if the probability
of success at this site is greater than s. The expected payo to a consumer from searching
the kth site conditional on having gotten failures from the rst k   1 is E(qk:Njz1 = ::: =
zk 1 = 0). (The fk:N in the formula is the PDF of the kth order statistic of F.)
QED
13We will see in section 4 that our model does have an equilibrium in which this occurs.
14As is Ellison, Fudenberg, and M obius (2004) we write q
1:N for the highest value, in contrast to the usual
convention in statistics, which is to call the highest value the N
th order statistic.
93.2 Welfare gains from information provision
Lists of sponsored links provides consumers with two types of information. They identify a
set of links that may meet the consumer's need, and they provide information on relative
quality that helps consumers search through this set more eciently. To bring out this
latter source of welfare gains it is instructive to consider how consumer search would dier
if advertisements were instead presented to consumers in a random order. Dene  q = E(qi):
In that case, the consumer expects each website to meet the need with probability  q.
Proposition 2 If the ads are sorted randomly, then consumers with s >  q don't click on
any ads. Consumers with s <  q click on ads until their need is met or they run out of ads.
Expected consumer surplus is
E(CS(s)) =
(
0 if s   q
( q   s)
1 (1  q)M
 q if s <  q
Proof: The clicking strategies are obvious. Consumers who are willing to search get
( q s) from the rst search. If this is unsuccessful (which happens with probability (1   q))
they get ( q s) from their second search. The total payo is ( q s)(1+(1   q)+(1   q)2 +
::: + (1    q)M 1):
QED
3.3 A tractable special case: uniformly distributed valuations
One nice feature of our model which we'll exploit at some points is that the special case
with uniformly-distributed valuations is surprisingly tractable: fairly simple closed-form
expressions can be given for many of the terms that come up in the propositions. We will
use these formulas to help build intuition and to present more explicit results. The following
results are proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 1 For uniform F, if consumers search an ordered list from the top down, then
E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0) =
N + 1   k
N + k





Corollary 1 If the rms are sorted by quality in equilibrium and the distribution F of rm











Assuming that the quality distribution is uniform also makes it easy to compute ex-
pected consumer surplus. The expected payo from clicking on the top link is E(q1:N) s =
N=(N + 1)   s. If the rst link is unsuccessful, which happens with probability 1=(N + 1),
then (using Lemma 1) the consumer gets utility E(q2:Njz1 = 0) s = (N  1)=(N +2) s
from clicking on the second. Adding up these payos over the number of searches that will
be done gives
Proposition 3 If the distribution of rm quality F is uniform, the expected utility of a
consumer with search cost s is:
E(CS(s)) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :















































1   1=2M if s  0
When N is large, the graph of the function above approaches 1 s whereas the unordered
payo is approximately 1   2s. N doesn't need to be very large at all for the function to
be close to its limiting value. For example, just looking at the rst term we know that for
N = 5 we have E(CS(s)) > 5=6   s for all s. The gure below graphs the relationship
between E(CS) and s for N = 4.
Similar welfare comparisons will arise more generally. When N is large and s is small
consumer welfare is approximately 1   s= q with unsorted links and approximately 1   s
with sorted links given any distribution of values with support [0;1].
4 Equilibrium of the Sponsored Search Auction
In this section we solve for the equilibrium of our base model taking both consumer and
advertiser behavior into account. Advertisers' bids are inuenced by click-through rates,




































Figure 1: Consumer surplus with sorted and unsorted links: N = 4
We restrict our attention to equilibria in which advertisers' bids are monotone increasing
in quality, so that consumers expect the list of rms to be sorted from highest to lowest
quality and search in a top-down manner.15
4.1 Equilibrium in the bidding game
Consider our formalization of an \ascending auction" in which the N rms bid for the
M < N positions. Note that conditional on being clicked on, a rm will be able to meet
a consumer's need with probability q. We've exogenously xed the per-consumer prot at
one, so q is like the value of a click in a standard position auction model.
Although one can think of our auction game as being like the EOS model with endoge-
nous click-through rates, the auction part of our model cannot be made to t within the
EOS framework. The reason is that the click-through rates are a function of the bidders'
types as well as of the positions on the list.16 The equilibrium derivation, however, is similar
to that of EOS.
Our rst observation is that, as in that model, rms will bid up to their true value to
get on the list, but will then shade their bids in the subsequent bidding for higher positions
on the list.
15In a model with endogenous search there will also be other equilibria. For example, if all remaining
bidders drop out immediately once M rms remain and are ordered arbitrarily by an auctioneer that cannot
distinguish among them, then consumers beliefs will be that the ordering of rms is meaningless, so it would
be rational for consumers to ignore the order in which the rms appear and for rms to drop out of the
bidding as soon as possible.
16BCPP have a more general setup, but they still assume that click-through rates do not depend on the
types of the other bidders.
12In the initial stage (stage M +1) when N > M rms remain, rms will get zero if they
are eliminated. Hence, for a rm with quality q it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid q.
We assume that all bidders behave in this way.
Once rms are sure to be on the list, however, they will not want to remain in the
bidding until it reaches their value. To see this, suppose that k rms remain and the k+1st
rm dropped out at bk+1. As the bid level b approaches q; a rm knows that it will get
q   bk+1 per click if it drops out now. If it stays in and no one else drops out before b
reaches q; nothing will change. If another rm drops out at q   , however, the rm would
do much worse: it will get more clicks, but its payo per click will just be q   (q   ) = .
Hence, the rm must drop out before the bid reaches its value.
Assume for now that the model has a symmetric strictly monotone equilibrium in which
drop out points b(k;bk+1;q) are only a function of (1) the number of rms k that remain;
(2) the current k + 1st highest bid, bk+1; and (3) the rm's privately known quality q.17
Suppose that the equilibrium is such that a rm will be indierent between dropping
out at b(k;bk+1;q) and remaining in the auction for an extra db and then dropping out
at b(k;bk+1;q) + db. This change in the strategy does not aect the rm's payo if no
other rm drops out in the db bid interval. Hence, to be locally indierent the rm must
be indierent between remaining for the extra db conditional on having another rm drop
out at b(k;bk+1;q). In this case the rm's expected payo if it is the rst to drop out is
E

(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)(1   q)jqk 1:N = q

 G( qk)  (q   bk+1):
The rst term in this expression is the probability that all higher websites will not meet a
consumer's need. The second is the demand term coming from the expected quality. The




(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)jqk 1:N = q

 G( qk 1)  (q   b):
The rst two terms in this expression are greater reecting the two mechanisms by which
higher positions lead to more clicks. The nal is smaller reecting the lower markup.
Indierence gives
G( qk)(1   q)(q   bk+1) = G( qk 1)(q   b)
This can be solved for b.
17In principle, drop out points could condition on the history of drop out points in other ways. One can
set b
k+1 = 0 in the initial stage when no rm has yet to drop out.
13Proposition 4 The auction game has a symmetric strictly monotone pure strategy equi-




q if k > M




G( qk 1)(1   q)

if k  M:
(1)
Sketch of proof: First, it is easy to show by induction on k that the strategies dened
in the proposition are symmetric strictly monotone increasing and always have qi  bk+1
on the equilibrium path. The calculations above establish that the given bidding functions
satisfy a rst-order condition.
To show that the solution to the rst-order condition is indeed a global best response we
combine a natural single-crossing property of the payo functions { the marginal benet of
a higher bid is greater for a higher quality rm { and the indierence on which the bidding
strategies are based. For example, we can show that the change in prots when a type q0
bidder increases his bid from b(q0) to b(^ q) is negative using



















Formalizing this argument is a little tedious, so we have left it to the appendix.
QED
Remarks
1. In this equilibrium rms start out bidding up to their true value until they make it
onto the list. Once they make it onto the list they start shading their bids. If q is
close to one, then the bid shading is very small. When q is small, in contrast, bids
increase slowly with increases in a rm's quality because there isn't much gain from
outbidding one more bidder.
2. The strategies have the property that when a rm drops out of the nal M; it is
common knowledge that no other rm will drop out for a nonzero period of time.
3. Bidders shade their bids less when bidding for higher positions, i.e. b(k;b0;q) is
decreasing in k with b0 and q xed, if and only if
G( qk 1)
G( qk) is decreasing in k. This can
14be seen most easily by rewriting (1) as
b = q  
G( qk)
G( qk 1)
(1   q)(q   bk+1):
One may get some intuition for whether the condition is likely to hold in practice
by examining the growth in click-through rates as a rm moves from position k to
position k 1. In the model this is
G( qk 1)
(1 qk 1:N)G( qk), and industry sources report that it
decreases moderately to rapidly in k, which is consistent with less bid shading at the
top positions. However, since qk:N is also declining in k, the declining click-through
rates could also be due to rapidly decreasing quality lower down the list.
4. EOS show that the similar equilibrium of their model is unique among equilibria in
strategies that are continuous in types and note that there are other equilibria that
are discontinuous in types. The indierence condition we derive should imply that
equilibrium is also unique in our model if one restricts attention to an appropriate class
of strategies with continuous strictly monotone bidding functions. As Chen and He
(2006) also note, however, there are also other equilibria. For example, if consumers
believe that the links are sorted randomly (and therefore search in a random order),
then there will be an equilibrium in which all rms drop out as soon as M rms
remain.
4.2 Formulas for the uniform case
The simplicity of the expressions for Bayesian updating in the model with uniformly dis-
tributed values allows us to provide a number of explicit formulas that may be instructive.
Here, we characterize unconditional CTRs and conditional CTRs taking into account what
a rm infers about the rm-quality distribution when a change to its bid is pivotal, and
provide a more explicit formula for the equilibrium strategies.
In a search model, the clicks received by the kth rm is decreasing in k for two reasons:
some consumers will have already met their need before getting to the kth position on
the list; and a lower position signals to consumers that the rm's quality is lower, which
reduces the number of consumers willing to click on the link. When consumer search costs
are uniformly distributed, the probability that a consumer whose needs have not been met
by the rst k   1 websites will click on the kth website is just the expected quality of the
kth website conditional on the consumer having had k   1 unsuccessful experiences, which
we derived in the previous section.
15Proposition 5 Assume s and q  U[0;1]. Write D(k) for the ex ante expected clicks
received by the kth website and D(k;q) for the number of clicks a website of quality q






k 1 N + 1   k
N + k
D(k) =
1  3    (2k   3)
(N + 1)(N + 2):::(N + k   1)
N + 1   k
N + k
Details of the calculations are in the Appendix. Substituting values for the uniform
distribution into our previous Proposition also yields a fairly simple expressions for the
equilibrium strategies.
Corollary 2 When both qualities and search costs are uniform it is a PBE for rms to
choose dropout points according to
b(k;bk+1;q) = bk+1 + (q   bk+1)





(N + 1)2   (k   1)2

:
Proof: The expression for the uniform distribution is obtained by substituting the ex-





(N + 1   k)=(N + k)
(N + 1   (k   1))=(N + (k   1))
= 1  
2N + 1
(N + 1)2   (k   1)2:
QED
5 Reserve Prices
We now turn to questions of auction design. Such questions are of practical interest for
two reasons: they are of interest to rms designing auctions; and antitrust and regulatory
authorities will need to interpret actions being taken in what is a concentrated industry.
Auction design questions also bring up some interesting economic theory because the prin-
ciples of auction design can be substantially altered by the mechanism we noted in the
introduction: changes to the auction design aect consumer beliefs about the quality of
sponsored links and thereby aect the \values" of prizes that are being auctioned. In this
section we discuss a common and important design decision: the setting of reserve prices.
In a standard auction model reserve prices increase the auctioneer's expected revenues.
At the same time, however, they reduce social welfare. Hence, they could inhibit seller or
16buyer entry in a model in which these were endogenous, and might not be optimal in such
models.18 Edelman and Schwarz (2006) provide theoretical and numerical analyses of the
the impact of reserve prices in the position auction model and show that the GSP auction
with an optimally chosen reserve price is an optimal mechanism. Here, we show that the
considerations are somewhat dierent in our model: reserve prices can increase both the
prots of the auctioneer and social welfare. The reason for this dierence is that consumers
incur search costs on the basis of their expectation of rm quality. When the quality of
a rm's product is low relative to this expectation, the search costs consumers incur are
inecient. By instituting a reserve price, the auctioneer commits not to list products of
suciently low quality and can reduce this source of welfare loss. This in turn, can increase
the number of searches that consumers are willing to carry out. Increases in the volume of
trade are another channel through which welfare can increase.
We rst discuss the special case of uniformly distributed search costs. This one special-
ization allows us to derive a theorem on the alignment of interests that is very general on
other dimensions. This allows us to provide some complete characterizations and it is also
a nice way to highlight forces that will remain present in more general specications. The
following subsection discusses general search cost distributions, illustrating some results
that are robust and highlighting forces that can make others change.
5.1 Reserve prices when search costs are uniformly distributed
In this subsection, we examine the special case of our model in which the search costs
distribution G is uniform on [0;1]. We restrict our analyses to equilibria like those described
in the previous section in which rms use strictly monotone bidding strategies and bid their
true value when they will not be on the sponsored-link list. We intially consider a general
quality distriubtion F, and later give some results for F uniform.
5.1.1 The optimal reserve price for consumers also maximizes social welfare
In this section we present a striking result on the alignment of consumer and adver-
tiser/search engine preferences: the welfare maximizing and consumer surplus maximizing
policies coincide. Moreover, for any reserve price, the sum of advertiser prot and search
engine prot is twice the consumer surplus. This occurs because producer surplus is directly
related to the probability that consumers have their needs satised and because consumers
18See Ellison, Fudenberg and M obius (2004) for more on a model of competing auction sites in which this
eect would be important.
17search optimally and have uniformly distributed search costs.
Proposition 6 Suppose the distribution of search costs is uniform. Consumer surplus
and social welfare are maximized for the same reserve price. Given any bidding behavior
by advertisers and any reserve price policy of the search engine, equilibrium behavior by
consumers implies E(W) = 3E(CS).
Proof: Write GCS for the gross consumer surplus in the model: GCS = CS + Search
Costs.19 Write GPS for the gross producer surplus: GPS = Advertiser Prot + Search-
engine fees. Because a search produces one unit of GCS and one unit of GPS if a consumer
need is met and zero units of each otherwise we have E(GCS) = E(GPS).
Welfare is given by W = GCS +GPS  Search Costs. Hence, to prove the theorem we
only need to show that E(Search Costs) = 1
2E(GCS). This is an immediate consequence
of the optimality of consumer search and the uniform distribution of search costs: each ad
is clicked on by all consumers with s 2 [0;E(qjX)] who have not yet had their needs met,
where X is the information available to consumers at the time the ad is presented. Hence,




1. Note that the alignment result is fully general in the dimension of not requiring any
assumptions on the distribution F of rm qualities.
2. The alignment result does not depend on the assumption that consumers and ad-
vertisers both receive exactly one unit of surplus from a met need. If advertisers
receive benet  from meeting a consumer's need, then E(W) = (1
2 + )E(GCS) =
(1 + 2)E(CS):
3. The alignment result with uniform search costs is a special case of a slightly more
general result. If the search cost distribution is G(s) = s, then welfare and consumer
surplus are proportional with E(W) = (2 + 1
)E(CS). The argument is similar and
uses the fact that E(sjs  q) remains proportional to q for this family of distributions.
(E(sjs  q) = q=( + 1).)
19More precisely, GCS is the population average gross consumer surplus. It is a random variable, with
the realized value being a function of the realized qualities. The other measures of welfare and consumer
and producer surplus we discuss should be understood similarly.
184. The alignment result pertains to producer surplus, but it does not say anything about
the distinct reserve price preferences of advertisers and search engines. As shown in
more detail in the next section, advertisers and the search engine are typically in
conict with one another and with consumers about the level of reserve prices.
Our next result is a corollary that follows neatly from Proposition 6: we show that
the socially optimal reserve price coincides with the reserve price that would be chosen by
a consumer-surplus maximizing search engine both when commitment to a reserve price
is possible and when it is not (e.g.,the search engine can trick the consumers into click-
ing on ads by claiming it has a higher reserve price than it really uses). This result is
of interest for two distinct reasons. First, it is plausible to think that, so long as mar-
ket shares remain somewhat balanced, some real-world search engines may use consumer-
surplus maximization as an objective function. Search engines are in dynamic competition
to attract consumers and to the extent that the future is very important (and foregone
prots small), designing the search engine to maximize consumer surplus may be a good
rule-of-thumb approximation to the optimal dynamic policy. Second, the observation about
the no-commitment model turns out to be a useful computational tool { it can be easier to
nd the equilibrium in the no commitment model than to nd the maximizer of the social
welfare function.
Corollary 3 Suppose the distribution of search costs is uniform. Suppose that reserve price
rW maximizes social welfare when the search engine has the ability to commit to a reserve
price. Then, rW is an equilibrium choice for a consumer-surplus maximizing search engine
regardless of whether the search engine has the ability to commit to a reserve price.
Proof: The coincidence of the two reserve prices with commitment is an immediate
consequence of Proposition 6.
To see that the socially optimal reserve price is also an equilibrium outcome when the
search engine lacks commitment power, write CS(q;q0) for the expected consumer surplus
if consumers believe that the search engine displays a sorted list of all advertisers with
quality at least q, but the search engine actually displays all advertisers with quality at
least q0. The optimality of consumer search behavior implies CS(q;q0)  CS(q0;q0). The
assumption that advertisers play an equilibrium with strictly monotone strategies for any
reserve price and that rW is the socially optimal reserve price imply that for any q0 we
have CS(q0;q0)  CS(rW;rW). Any deviation by the rm to a dierent reserve price yields
19consumer surplus of CS(rW;q0) for some q0. This cannot improve consumer surplus because
CS(rW;q0)  CS(q0;q0)  CS(rW;rW).
QED
Remark
1. Note that the result is that a consumer-surplus maximizing search engine will not
suer from a lack of commitment power. A social-welfare maximizing search engine
would suer if it lacked commitment power. Proposition 6 shows that consumer
surplus and welfare are proportional if consumers have correct beliefs. If the search
engine deviates from its equilibrium strategy, then consumers will have incorrect
beliefs. Hence, such deviations can increase welfare. Indeed, a deviation to a lower
reserve price would typically be expected to increase welfare because consumers do
not internalize the prots that advertisers and the search engine get from their clicks.
When a deviation to a slightly lower reserve price results in additional links being
displayed it will lead to more clicks and raise welfare. In equilibrium, of course, this
incentive cannot exist, so the result will be that the equilibrium reserve price is too
low.
5.1.2 Socially optimal reserve prices with one-position lists
To bring out the economics of setting reserve prices and the tradeos for the welfare of
participants, we rst consider the simplest version of our model: when the position auction
lists only a single rm (M = 1). In this case, if the auctioneer commits to a reserve price
of r; then consumers' expectations of the quality of a listed rm is





Because consumers with s 2 [0;E(q1:Njq1:N > r)) will examine a link if it is presented, the
average search cost of searching consumers is 1
2E(q1:Njq1:N > r). In the no-commitment
model the search engine will only display a link if the net benet is positive. This implies
that it will display links with quality at least 1
2E(q1:Njq1:N > r). Equilibrium therefore
requires that r = 1
2E(q1:Njq1:N > r).
The probability that a link is displayed is 1   F(r)N. The mass of consumers who will
click on a link if one is displayed is E(q1:Njq1:N > r). Hence, expected consumer surplus is
E(CS) = (1   F(r)N)G( q1(r))
 






E(q1:Njq1:N > r)2(1   F(r)N):







2 (1   rN+1)2
1   rN :20
By Proposition 6, the socially optimal reserve price is the maximizer of this expression.
Maximizing this expression gives the second part of the proposition below.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the list has one position and that the distribution of search
costs is uniform.





E(q1:Njq1:N  r): (3)
(ii) If in addition the distribution F of rm qualities is uniform, then the welfare max-
imizing reserve price r is the positive solution to r + r2 + ::: + rN = N=(N + 2): The
welfare-maximizing reserve price is one-third when N = 1. It is increasing in N and con-
verges to one-half as N ! 1.
Remarks
1. Note that the formula (3) applies for any advertiser-quality distribution, not just
when advertiser qualities are uniform. Providing a general result is easier here than
in some other places because with lists of length one it is not necessary to consider
how consumers Bayesian update when links do not meet their needs.
2. The N = 1 result for a uniform F follows easily from (3): when r = 1=3, consumer
expectations will be that q  U[1=3;1], and consumers search if and only if s 2 [0;2=3],
so the average search costs is indeed 1/3. The N large result extends to general
distributions: E(q1:Njq1:N > r)  1 for N large, so the solution has r  1
2.
3. In the model with a uniform F it is easy to see that expected consumer surplus, search
engine prots and social welfare are all higher with a small positive reserve price than
with no reserve price. Writing SR(r) for the search engine's revenue when it uses a















This is increasing in r for small r.
20The expected quality is E(q
1:Njq





215.1.3 Welfare and the distribution of rents with one-position lists
We noted above that that expected consumer surplus and expected producer surplus are
proportional, and hence maximized at the same reserve price. The \producer surplus" in
that calculation is the sum of search engine revenue and advertiser surplus. In this section
we note that these two components of producer surplus are less aligned: search engines may
prefer a reserve price much greater than the social optimum and advertisers may prefer a
reserve price much smaller than the social optimum.21
The most general results on preference conicts are immediate corollaries of our align-
ment theorem. Consumers are worse o with the prot-maximizing reserve price than with
the socially optimal reserve price because consumer surplus is proportional to social wel-
fare. Advertisers are also worse o with the prot-maximizing reserve price: total producer
surplus is lower and advertisers are getting a smaller share of the total producer surplus.22
To get a richer picture of the magnitude of the conicts it is instructive to write SR(r),
AS(r) and GPS(r) for the random variables giving the search engine revenue, advertiser
surplus, and producer surplus, respectively, which result when the search engine uses a
reserve price of r (and this is known to consumers). These expectations of these are related
by a simple division-of-surplus function:
E(SR(r)) = (1   F(r)N)G( q1(r))E(max(q2:N;r)jq1:N  r)
= (r)E(GPS(r))
E(AS(r)) = (1   (r))E(GPS(r));





The (r) function has r  (r)  1 and hence satises limr!1 (r) = 1 for any quality
distribution, i.e. the search engine gets almost all of the (very small) surplus when the
reserve price is very high. For many distributions, including the uniform, the (r) function
is strictly increasing on [0;1], although this is not true for all distributions.23 When the
21Edelman and Schwarz (2006) illustrate this preference divergence in simulations.
22The advertiser share must be lower because otherwise the search engine could increase its prots by
shifting to the socially optimal reserve price.
23The (r) function is also increasing when F(r) = r
 for any  > 0. A simple example to show that it
is not always increasing would be a two point distribution with mass 1    on q =
1
2 and mass  on q = 1.
For this distribution we have (
1
2)  1 and (
1
2 + ) 
1
2.
22division of surplus function (r) is increasing in r, the prot-maximizing reserve price for
the search engine is greater than the social optimum.24
In section 5.1.1 we argued that consumer-surplus maximization might be a reasonable
approximation to the objective function of a search engine in a competitive dynamic en-
vironment. If a search engine instead maximizes a weighted average of consumer surplus
and prot and the consumer surplus and prot functions are single-peaked, then a lesser
weight on consumer surplus will result in a reserve price that is worse for social welfare,
consumers, and advertisers, but better for the search engine. This comparison could be
relevant for evaluating changes in industry structure that make search engines less willing
to invest in attracting consumers instead of maximizing short-run prots.
Figure 2 illustrates the conicting preferences of advertisers, consumers, and the search
engine in two specications of the model. In each panel, we have graphed expected adver-
tiser surplus, expected consumer surplus, and expected search engine prot as a function
of the reserve price and drawn vertical lines at the values of r that maximize each of these
functions.
The right panel is for a model with three rms drawn from a uniform quality distribution.
In this model, consumer surplus turns out to be fairly at over a wide range of reserve prices.
The advertiser-optimal and search engine prot-maximizing prices are quite far apart, but
consumer surplus at both of these points is not very far from its optimum. An intuition for
the atness of the consumer surplus function is that reserve prices in this range are rarely
binding, and hence there is little direct eect on the probability of a link being displayed
and little indirect eect via changes in consumer beliefs. The main eect of a shift from
consumer-optimal to prot-maximizing reserve prices is a redistribution in surplus from
advertisers to the search engine.
The left panel is for a model with three rms with qualities drawn from the CDF
F(q) =
p
q. This distribution is more concentrated on low quality realizations, which
makes consumer surplus and advertiser prots more sensitive to the reserve price in the
relevant range. In each panel we have also graphed an equally weighted average of consumer
surplus and search-engine prot. The curvature of the functions involved is such that the
maximizer of this average is closer to the prot-maxizing level than to the socially optimal
level.
24More precisely, the prot-maximizing reserve price is always weakly greater than the social optimum
if (r) is weakly increasing and strictly greater if one assumes other regularity conditions. For example, if
E(CS(r)) is dierentiable at the social optimum and (r) has a nonzero derivative at this point.
23Figure 2: Welfare and distribution of surplus for two specications
5.1.4 Optimal reserve price with M position lists
Thinking about the socially optimal reserve price as the equilibrium outcome with a consumer-
surplus maximizing search engine is also useful in the full M position model. Holding
consumer expectations about the reserve price xed, making a small change dr to the
search-engine's reserve price makes no dierence unless it leads to a change in the number
of ads displayed. We can again solve for the socially optimal r by nding the reserve price
for which an increase of dr that removes an ad from the list has no impact on consumer
surplus.
The calculation, however, is more complicated than in the one-position case because
there are two ways in which removing a link form the set of links displayed can aect
consumer surplus. First, as before there is a change in consumer surplus from consumers
who reach the bottom of the list and would have clicked on the nal link with q = r if it
had been displayed, but will not click on it if it is not displayed. The benet from these
clicks would have been r. The cost would have been the search cost, which is one-half of
the average of the consumers' conditional expectations of q when considering clicking on
the nal link on the list. Second, not displaying a link at the bottom of the list will reduce
consumer expectations about the quality of all higher-up links, and thereby deter some
24consumers from clicking on these links. Any changes of this second type are benecial:
when the list contains m < M links, consumer expectations when considering clicking on
the kth link, k < m are E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0;qm:N > r;qm+1:N < r). If the nal link
is omitted, consumer beliefs will change to E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0;qm 1:N > r;qm:N <
r). This latter belief coincides with E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0;qm 1:N > r;qm:N = r).
Hence, by not including the marginal link, consumers will be made to behave exactly as
they would with correct beliefs about the mth rm's quality.
We write pm(r) for the probability that the mth highest quality is r conditional on one
of the M highest qualities being equal to r. The discussion above shows:
Proposition 8 Suppose the distributions of search costs and rm qualities are uniform.
For any N and M, the welfare-maximizing reserve price r is the solution to the rst-order
condition
@E(CS)





pM(r)E(qM:NjqM:N > r) +
M 1 X
m=1




1. We conjecture that for uniformly distributed qualities and search costs, the optimal
reserve price is decreasing in M and converges to 1
2 in the limit as N ! 1. We
computed the expected consumer surplus numerically for M = 2 and N 2 f2;3;4;5g.
For N = 2, expected consumer surplus is maximized at r  0:276968. For N = 5,
expected consumer surplus is maximized at r  0:469221.
5.1.5 More general policies
In the analysis above we considered policies that involved a single reserve price that applies
regardless of the number of links that are displayed. A search engine would obviously be
at least weakly better o if it could commit to a policy in which the reserve price was a
function of the position. For example, a search engine could have the policy that no ads will
be displayed unless the highest bid is at least r1, at most one ad will be displayed unless
the second-highest bid is at least r2, and so on. A rough intuition for how such reserve
prices might be set (from largely ignoring eects of the second type) is that they should
be set so that the reserve price for the mth position is approximately (but slightly greater
than) one-half of consumers' expectations of quality when they are considering clicking on
the mth and nal link on the list. This suggests that declining reserve prices may be better
than a constant reserve price.
25The idea of using more general reserve prices illustrates a more general idea: as long
as an equilibrium in which advertisers' qualities are revealed still exists, consumer surplus
(and hence welfare) is always improved if consumers are given more information about the
advertisers' qualities. In an idealized environment, the search engine could report inferred
qualities along with each ad. In practice, dierent positionings might be used to convey
this information graphically. One version of this already exists on the major search engines:
sponsored links are displayed both on the top of the search page and on the right side. The
top positions are the most desired by advertisers, but they are not always lled even when
some sponsored links are being displayed on the right side.
5.2 Reserve prices under general distributions
This section studies reserve prices under general assumptions on the distributions of search
costs and quality. The consumer optimal and socially optimal reserve prices will no longer
exactly coincide when search costs are not uniformly distributed, but informally one would
expect that there will typically be some rough alignment. In this section we present one
formal result illustrating robustness: we show that the consumer-optimal reserve price
is always positive. We also include a couple examples (one of which is clearly extreme)
illustrating how things can change: we show that the socally optimal reserve price may be
zero, and that the prot-maximizing reserve price can also be zero.
5.2.1 Consumer optimal reserve prices are positive
Our rst result is that consumer-surplus maximization requires a positive reserve price. We
prove this by showing that consumer surplus is increased when small positive reserve prices
are implemented. The intuition for this is that the main eect such reserve prices have is to
eliminate extremely low-quality rms from the sponsored-link list. These websites provide
almost no gross consumer surplus when consumers click on them. Hence, the benets are
outweighed by the much larger search costs incurred on such clicks.
Proposition 9 Consumer surplus is maximized at a strictly positive reserve price.
Proof:
Consider the eect on consumer surplus of a small increase in r starting from r = 0.
We show that consumer surplus is increased via a two step argument. The simple rst step
is to note that consumer rationality implies that consumer surplus with optimal consumer
behavior is greater that the surplus that consumers would receive if they behaved as if
26r = 0.25 The second step is to show that consumer surplus under this \r = 0" behavior is
greater when the search engine uses a small positive reserve price dr than when the search
engine uses r = 0.
If consumers use the r = 0 behavior, then consumer surplus is only aected by the
institution of a reserve price if the reserve price eliminates links from the list and consumers
would have clicked on these links if they were displayed. The gross consumer surplus from
each such click is bounded above by dr. The average search costs incurred on each such
click are bounded below by E(sjs   qM). The cost is independent of dr whereas the benet
is proportional to dr, so the costs dominate for small dr.
QED
5.2.2 Social welfare and revenue need not increase with reserve prices
In this section we show that both social welfare and search engine revenues need not be
maximized at a positive reserve price. We do so by presenting examples in which this
occurs. The examples are somewhat special, but serve to illustrate mechanisms by which
reserve prices can have adverse eects on advertisers and the search engine.
We start with social welfare. The intuition for why this can be reduced by reserve
prices is that reserve prices aect social welfare in two ways. First, they directly prevent
consumers from clicking on websites with quality less than r. Second, they inuence social
welfare via their other eects on consumer behavior. Consumers do too little searching
from a social perspective because they do not take rm prots into account. If changes
to the reserve price policies decrease the number of clicks that occur in equilibrium, then
social welfare can decrease.
Proposition 10 Social welfare can be strictly greater with a zero reserve price than with
any positive reserve price.
Proof:
Consider a model with M = N = 2 and the quality distribution F is uniform on [0;1].
Suppose that a fraction 1 of consumers have search costs uniformly distributed on [2
3 ; 2
3],
a fraction 2 have search costs uniformly distributed on [0;1] and a fraction 3 have have
search costs uniformly distributed on [0;].
In the rst subpopulation (with s  2
3), small reserve prices reduce welfare. These
consumers click on the rst website but not the second when there is no reserve price.
25Formally, we suppose that consumers behave exactly as they would if the list had M links and r = 0
when deciding whether to click on any link that is displayed and do not click on links that are not displayed.
27Hence, the gain in welfare derived from the search engine not displaying a site they would
have clicked on is just O(r2). Small reserve prices also have an eect that works through
changes consumer beliefs: given any small positive r, consumers will not click at all if only
one link is displayed. The expected gross surplus from clicking on a single link is 21+r
2 ,
whereas the search cost incurred is less than 2
3, so losing these clicks is socially inecient.
The probability that this will occur is 2r(1   r) so the loss in social welfare is O(r). The
appendix contains a formal derivation of this and shows that the per consumer loss in
welfare from using any reserve price in [0; 1
3   2] is at least 2
3r.
An example using just the rst subpopulation does not suce to prove the proposition
for two reasons: (1) the search cost distribution in this example does not have full support;
and (2) although small reserve prices reduce welfare in the rst subpopulation it turns out
that a larger reserve price (r > 1
3 2) will increase welfare. (The argument above no longer
applies when r is suciently large so that consumers will click on the link when a single
link is displayed.)
The rst problem is easily overcome by adding a very small fraction 2 of consumers
with search costs uniformly distributed on [0;1]. Welfare gains in this group are rst-order
in r when r is small and bounded when r is large, so adding a suciently small fraction of
such consumers won't aect the calculations.
The second problem is also easily overcome by adding a subpopulation of consumers
with search costs in [0;]. Welfare is improved in this subpopulation when a small positive
reserve price is implemented, but the eect is so weak that we can add a large mass of these
consumers without overturning the small r result from the rst subpopulation.26 There
is a substantial welfare loss in this subpopulation if the search engine uses a large reserve
price. Hence, adding an appropriate mass of these consumers makes the net eect of using
a reserve price of 1
3   2 or greater also negative.
QED
Our second result is a demonstration that using a small positive reserve prices can also
reduce search engine revenue. The example we use to demonstrate this highlights another
dierence between our model and standard auction models. The crucial property of these
models that helps drive our examples is that increasing r increases consumer expectations
of the quality of all links, including the bottom one. This makes the Mth position more
attractive, which can reduce bids for the M  1st position. Because bids depend recursively
26The per consumer welfare benet from a small reserve price is bounded above by total search costs
incurred in clicking on ads with quality less than Minfr;g, which is less than 2Minfr;g=2.
28on lower bids, this can reduce reduce bids on higher positions as well.
Proposition 11 There exist distributions F and G for which search engine revenue is
decreasing in the reserve price in a neighborhood of r = 0.
To see why this can be true, consider the following stark example. Suppose M = N = 2,
and all consumers have search costs of exactly  q2. Assume that with no reserve price
consumers click only on the top link. Hence, rms will bid up to their true value to be in
the top position and and search engine revenue is E(q2:N). Given any positive reserve price
r, consumers will click on both links. The increased attractiveness of the second position
leads to a jump down in bids for the rst position. This, of course, leads to a jump down
in revenue. To see this formally, bids for the rst position (when two rms have q > r) will
satisfy the indierence condition:
(q   b(q)) = (1   q)(q   r):
This gives b(q) = r+q(q r). When r  0 expected revenues are approximately E((q2:N)2).
This is a disrete jump down from E(q2:N).
Again, the example is not a formal proof of the Proposition for two reasons: (1) the
search cost distribution does not have full support; and (2) we've assumed the search cost
distribution has a mass point at  q2. One could easily modify the example to make it t
within our model. Problem (1) could be overcome by adding a small mass 2 of consumers
with search costs uniformly distributed on [0;1]. And problem (2) could be overcome by
spreading out the rst population to have search costs uniformly distributed on [ q2;  q2 +].
We did not feel, however, that the calculations would be suciently enlightening to make
it worth doing this for a uniform F or some other such example.
This example is obviously quite special. We include it to ilustrate the mechanism that
makes it possible, and do not mean to suggest that declining reserve prices are likely to be
seen in real-world auctions.
6 Click-weighted Auctions
Another feature of real-world auctions that is very important both for private and social
reasons is that the auctions are weighted: advertisers are ranked on the basis of the product
of the their bid and a factor that reects the ads predicted click-through rate (and other
aspects of the \quality" of the ad).27 The rough motivation for this is straightforward:
27See BCPP (2007) and Jeziorski and Segal (2009) for empirical evidence on the magnitude of dierences
in click-through rates and many other insights.
29weighting bids by their click-through rates is akin to ranking them on their contributions
to search-engine revenues (as opposed to per-click revenues which is a less natural objective).
In this section we develop a extension of our model with observably heterogeneous rms
and use it to examine the implications of click-through weighting. We note that even the
simplest argument for click-through weighting is not straightforward in our environment
and identify several considerations that rms will want to take into account in designing a
weighting scheme.
Formally, we consider a model in which each rm has a two dimensional type (;q). A
rm of type (;q) is able to meet the needs of a fraction q of consumers. Whether it can
meet the need is partially observable. A fraction  of consumers know from reading the
advertisement that the rm can meet their need with probability q (but still don't know the
value of q) and a fraction 1    know that the rm cannot meet their need. For example,
a shoe web site might specify in the text that it serves only women or sells only athletic
shoes. We assume that whether a rm can potentially help a consumer is independent
across rms. We further assume that the  parameters are known to the search site and to
consumers.
We assume that there are no costs incurred in reading the ads and learning whether a
rm is a potential match (recall the ads are text and are limited in length). Consumers do,
however, still need to pay s if they want to investigate a site further by clicking on it and
learn whether it does meet their need. Again, this happens with probabilty q if the rm is
a potential match.
6.1 A standard argument for click-weighting auctions
A model of the click-weighted auction is that the rms submit per-click bids b1;:::;bN.28
The winning bidders are the M bidders for which ibi is largest. They are ranked in order
of ibi. If rm i is in the kth position, its per-click payment is the lowest bid that would
have placed it in this position, k+1bk+1=i.29
Proposition 12 In equilibrium, the winners of the click-weighted auction are the M rms
for which iqi is largest. In the limit as s ! 0, social surplus converges to the rst-best.
28Again, we can think of this informally as an oral ascending bid auction, but our formalization will be
as a multistage game as in our base model.
29Note that as in our earlier discussions of bids we use subscripts as indexes when the index is a rm
identity and superscripts as indexes when the index is the rank of the rm in the bidding, e.g. 1 is the
click-through weight of rm 1 and 
3 is the click-through weight of the rm that is the third-to-last to drop
out (in the weighted bidding).
30Proof: Each rm gets zero payo if it is not on the list. Hence, as long as more that M
rms remain, each rm i will want to increase its bid until it reaches qi. This ensures that
the rms for which iqi is largest are the winners.
When s is small, consumers will search all listed rms that are potential matches until
nding a match. The probability of nding a match is 1 
QM
k=1(1 kqk). This is maximized
when the listed rms are those for which iqi is largest.
QED
6.2 Ineciencies of click-weighting
The above proposition is only a partial eciency theorem for a two reasons, however.
6.2.1 Ineciency in the set of listed rms
First, when s is not extremely close to zero, utility is not necessarily maximized by choosing
the rms for which iqi is largest. The reason is that consumers' search costs are reduced if
we include rms for which qi is larger even if iqi is lower. For example, if M is large, then
a list of the sites with the largest q's would be almost sure to contain several sites that were
potential matches for each consumer, even if the 's for these sites are small. By searching
through the sites that are potential matches a consumer would meet his or her need with
high probability and incur minimal search costs.
One practical implication of this observation is that click-weighted auctions may allow
rms like eBay and Nextag to win more sponsored-link slots than would be socially optimal.
The breadth of these sites may allow them to meet more consumers' needs than would a
more specialized site, but the extra revenues may be more than fully oset by additional
consumer search costs.
6.2.2 Ineciency in the ordering of listed rms
Second, the click-weighted auction may provide consumers with less than ideal information
about the relative q's of the dierent websites.
Proposition 13 The click-weighted auction always has an equilibrium in which all remain-
ing rms drop out immediately as soon as just M rms remain.
The equilibrium strategies are the obvious ones: rms remain in bidding until the
bid reaches q if there are more than M rms remaining and then drop out immediately
once M rms remain. When rms follow these strategies, consumers' beliefs about the
31quality of each remaining rm i conditioning on all available information X is E(qijX) =
EbM+1E(qijiqi > M+1bM+1). This is higher for rms with a lower , so it is an equilibrium
for consumers to ignore the ordering of the rms on the list and search in increasing order
of . With this consumer behavior there is no benet to bidding for a higher position and
immediate drop out is optimal.
The lack of sorting by q means this auction loses the welfare gain from sorting discussed
in Section 3. Immediate dropout equilibria also existed in the unweighted auction model {
all consumers can search in a random order { but we mention them here because they seem
more natural and robust when consumers have reason to believe that some advertisers are
better than others and strictly prefer to search in the way that they do. One robustness
criterion that would distinguish the click-weighted model from the unweighted model is that
behavior would not change substantially in the click-weighted model if consumers thought
that there was an  probability that the ordering was informative and a 1    probability
that the ordering was not.30
Although we think these incomplete-sorting equilibria are natural, it should be noted
that greater information revelation is also possible. In fact, the model also has an equilib-
rium with full sorting in one special case. To dene this, let s be such that all consumers
with search costs s < s will search all listed websites as long as their need has not been
met.31
Proposition 14 Suppose that N = M = 2 and the support of the search cost distribution
G is a subset of [0;s]. Then, the click weighted auction has an equilibrium in which the two
rms bid according to b
i(q) = jq2
i . In this equilibrium the rm with the highest q is always
in the rst position on the list.
Proof: Note that the strategies are monotone and satisfy 1b
1(q) = 2b
2(q). Hence,
if rms follow these strategies the winner in a click-weighted auction is the rm with the
highest q. Because all consumers search both rms, rm i's demand is i if it is rst on the
list and its expected demand from the second position (condition on the other rm being
about to drop out) is i(1   jq). Firm i's indierence condition becomes
i(q   b
i(q)) = i(1   jq)(q   0):
30Chen and He (2006) note that the immediate-dropout equilibria in the unweighted mdoel are nonrobust
to assuming that an  fraction of consumers always search in a top down manner. This remains true in the
click-weighted auction.
31An s > 0 with this property will exist if the 's are bounded away from zero. For example, it suces to
set s = E(q
Mj
M = 1;
1 = ::: = 
M 1 = ;z
1 = z
2 = ::: = z
M 1 = 0):
32This condition is satised for the given bidding function.
QED
This example uses several special assumptions. These are largely necessary to get full
sorting. For example, one can show that there are no equilibria with full sorting when
1 6= 2 if one assumes instead that N > 2 and/or that G has full support on [0;1].32 A
rough intuition for this is that the solution to the asymmetric rst-order condition will




6.3 A new auction design: two-stage auctions and ecient sorting
To eliminate the information loss due to imperfect sorting one could use a two step pro-
cedure.33 First, have the rms bid as in the standard click-weighted auction until only M
bidders remain. Then, continue the auction allowing bidders to raise bids further, but use
a dierent weighting scheme so that the equilibrium will have the rm with the highest q
winning.
In theory, this is not hard to do. For example, if M = 2 and N > 2 and rms 1 and
2 are the remaining rms it will suce to choose asymmetric payment schedules p1(q) and
p2(q) such that it will be an equilibrium for rms to to announce their true qualities q1
and q2 if we ask rms to announce their qualities, put the rm with the highest announced
quality in the rst position, and assign a per-click payment of pi(q i)) to the winning rm
i and b33=j to the losing rm j.
To see that such payment schedules exist, note that if a rm is the last to drop out, its
expected prot is
1ii(qi   pi(q i));
where 1i = G(E(qijqi > q i;X)) with X the event that rms 1 and 2 are the two winning
bidders. If the rm is the second to drop out, its expected prot is
(2i(1   j) + 3ij(1   q i))i(qi   b33=i);
where 2i = G(E(qijqi < q i;X)) and 3i = G(E(qijqi < q i;X;z i = 0)). It is straight-
forward to choose pi(q) so that these two expressions are equal conditional on q i = qi, in
32We thank Dmitry Taubinsky for these results.
33Note that we leave aside the issues of selecting the correct rms to be on the page and whether providing
some other ordering might be better than sorting on quality.
33which case the necessary indierence condition for a truth-telling equilibrium is satised.34
Note that to implement such rules the search engine needs to know the 's and also needs to
know what click-through rates each rm will receive given each possible ordering. Knowing
the 's is necessary for everything we've done in this section. The additional informational
requirements will be more of an obstacle to implementing such schemes in practice.
When s < s for all consumers the payment functions take a particularly simple form:
pi(q) = b33=i +  iq maxf(q   b33=i);0g:
Using this formula we can see that rm 2 is favored at low quality levels when 1 < 2 in the
sense that it makes a lower payment when the rms have equal qualities and these qualities
are near the lowest possible. At high quality levels the bid preference may be reversed.
6.4 Obfuscation
In this section we consider advertisers' decisions on how much information to convey in ad
text. Consumers benet from transparent ads that make it apparent whether a link will
meet their needs, because such ads let them to avoid unproductive clicks. In our base model
rms will also be happy to make ads completely transparent { they only receive a benet if
they can meet a consumer's need. In practice, rms may also receive a lesser benet from a
click even if they cannot meet the consumer's need. We consider such an extension here. We
note that the simplest pay per click auction works fairly well, but that both click-weighted
pay-per-click and pay-per-action auctions create incentives for obfuscation.35
We augment our base model in two ways. First, we assume that each rm i receives
some benet z from each click it receives independent of whether it meets the consumer's
need. There are several motivations for including such a benet: rms could earn immediate
prots from sales of unrelated products; they could get earn prots on future sales; or they
could earn advertising revenues. Second, we assume that each rm chooses an obfuscation
level i 2   [0;1]. If rm i chooses obfuscation level i then a fraction 1   i of the
consumers whose needs will not be met by the website will realize this just by reading the
text of the rm's ad (without incurring any search costs). We dene i  qi + i(1   qi)
34One can show that the pi(q) function dened in this way is monotone. Indierence need not hold when
the high  rm drops out at a point when the other rm is known to have higher quality. To complete the
specication without interfering with the selection of the nal two rms we set pi(q) = b
3
3=i if i <  i
and q < b
3
3=i.
35See Ellison and Ellison (2004, 2009) for a discussion of obfuscation including a number of examples
involving e-retailers, and Wilson (2008) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2009) for models in which rms inten-
tionally make search more costly.
34to be fraction of consumers who cannot tell whether site j will meet their need. Note that
our base model can be thought of as a special case of this model with z = 0 and no option
other than full obfuscation,  = f1g.
It is also necessary to specify how consumer inferences change with the possibility of
obfuscation. One possibility would be to assume that consumers understand the equilibrium
choice of i(qi), observe i for each website, and use this information to update their beliefs
about qi. We feel that this is unrealistic, however, and it leads to an unreasonable and
uninteresting degree of equilibrium multiplicity driven by the beliefs assigned when out-
of-equilibrium obfuscation levels are observed. We assume instead that consumers cannot
detect the obfuscation level chosen by any individual rm. We restrict our analysis to
equilibria in which rms are sorted on quality and consumers search in a top-down manner.
Let k be the fraction of consumers who will click on link k if the rst k   1 links do
not meet their needs and they are in the group that cannot tell whether the kth link meets
their needs. This will be a function of consumer beliefs about the quality of the kth website
and the equilibrium obfuscation strategies.36 One thing that simplies our analysis is that
k does not depend on the actual obfuscation level of the rm in position k.
6.4.1 Pay per click
Consider rst the simplest unweighted pay-per-click auction. Conditional on having dropped
out of the auction at a bid that places rm i in the kth position (k  M), rm i's payo is
(k;;bk+1;qi) = Xki(qi=i + z   bk+1) = Xk(qi + iz   ibk+1);
where X is the number of consumers who reach position k without having their needs met.
In equilibrium, a small change in i that does not aect rm i's position on the list cannot






(z   bk+1)Xk = (1   qi)(z   bk+1)Xk:
In equilibrium bM+1 will be at least z + qM+1:N, so this is negative and no obfuscation
occurs in equilibrium. The intuition is simple. Firms must pay for any clicks they receive.
The willingness to pay of losing bidders puts a oor on how cheap clicks can be. And this
gives rms an incentive to avoid clicks that provide only incidental benets.
36Note that beliefs about the quality of the k
th rm will no longer be independent of the realized qualities
because consumers will get some information about the qualities of lower-ranked rms by observing whether
these rms can also potentially meet their needs.
35If there was heterogeneity in the benets zi that rms receive from clicks that do not
meet consumers' needs, then it is possible that rms with large zi could engage in obfusca-
tion. But note that it would still be necessary for zi to be larger than the bid of the rm
in the next highest position, which suggests that obfuscation is unlikely to occur except
perhaps at very low positions on the list.
Consider now a click-weighted pay-per-click auction in which the search engine uses
click-through weights proportional to the i.37 Conditional on being in the kth position
(k  M), rm i's payo is
(k;;bk+1;qi) = Xk






This expression is monotone increasing in i. Hence, in equilibrium we get full obfuscation:
all rms choose i = 1. The intuition is that in the click-weighted auction, each rm's total
payment to the search engine is equal to the total payments that the rm below it would
make. Importantly, this quantity is independent of the number of clicks rm i receives.
Hence, rm i will design its ad to maximize the total revenue it can generate, and has
no incentive to avoid unproductive clicks. In thinking about practical applications, it is
noteworthy that we get full obfuscation even if the benet z is quite small.
In summary, the simplest pay-per-click auction rst used by Overture/Yahoo! mini-
mized obfuscation, but the now-standard click-weighted auction has an adverse side eect:
it creates incentives for obfuscation, because rms are not penalized for unnecessary clicks.
Search engines may attempt to combat obfuscation in various ways. Real-world search
engines have rules forbidding misleading ad text. They can enforce these via manual re-
views and by using the technological capabilities they have because they are search engine
operators: advertisers' landing pages can be examined for relevance to the query and adver-
tisements with irrelevant landing pages can be declined. Other approaches are also possible.
The pricing formula could be adjusted so that rm i's total expected payment is no longer
completely independent of its click-through rate, or continuous relevance measures (based
on textual analysis or the number of consumers who immediately return to the search page)
could be added to the pricing formula.
6.4.2 Pay per action
Search engines have been developing the capability to track how sales are made by their
advertisers. This leads to the question of whether it is advantageous to charge producers
37Note that we are implicitly assuming here that in equilibrium the search-engine has learned rm i's
click-through rate and uses it in determining the rankings and the per-click price rm i must pay.
36by sale made (\pay per action"), instead of charging them per click.38 Here, we discuss
what impact this might have on obfuscation.
To model pay-per-action auctions we suppose that rms submit bids bi which represent
payments to be made to the search engine every time a consumer clicks on their link and
meets their need. We assume the search engine tracks the fraction of clicks which result
in conversions, yi and uses the conversion rates as an additional weighting factor just as
click-through-rates are used in the click-weighted auctions: if the number of clicks that
website i willl receive in any position k is proportional to i and the fraction of clicking
consumers who will have their need met is yi, then the search engine ranks the rms on the
basis of iyibi and rm i will make a payment of of
k+1yk+1bk+1
iyi every time it meets a need
if its ad is displayed in position k.39
Conditional on being in the kth position (k  M), rm i's payo is
(k;;bk+1;qi) = Xk






This expression is virtually identical to the expression for the standard click-weighted auc-
tion. The result on obfuscation carries over: all rms choose full obfuscation. The intuition
is identical to that for the click-weighted auctions: each rm's total payment to the search
engine is equal to the total payments that the rm below it would make. This is indepen-
dent of the number of clicks rm i receives, so rm i has no incentive to avoid unproductive
clicks.
Similar to the case of click-weighted pay per click auctions, to mitigate this problem,
the search engine might want to adjust the weights on the click-through rate and the action
rate, to place more weight on actions and less on clicks, taking into account consumer search
costs. However, since advertisers generally dene the actions and they can be as broad as
arriving at a particular page in the advertiser's web site, advertisers who are penalized by
low action rates might redene their actions so that almost all clicks are also recorded as
actions; thus, in practice it may be dicult to place too much emphasis on actions.
38There are many reasons why pay-per-action pricing might be desirable for advertisers; for example, it
decreases risk for them if their ads are shown on a large network, where click fraud may be a problem.
39An unrealistic aspect of this formulation is the search engine is assumed to know everything about the
advertisers and could directly implement any ordering/payment scheme without using an auction. One
could recreate a motivation for an auction by adding heterogeneity in the size of the surplus that consumers
and the advertiser split when a need is met, but the simpler formulation conveys the main idea.
376.5 Product variety
In our click-weighted model, each site was assumed to have an independent chance of meet-
ing each consumer's needs. In practice these probabilities are unlikely to be independent.
For example, among the sponsored links provided on a recent search for \shorts" were An-
nTaylorLoft, ShopAdidas, and RalphLauren. A consumer who clicks on the Adidas site
will be more likely to be interested in other sites selling athletic shorts than in other sites
selling fashion shorts.
To consider this issue in the simplest extension of our model suppose that there are
three sites: site 1A, site 1B, and site 2. Suppose that a fraction 1 > 1=2 of consumers are
type 1 consumers and can potentially have their needs met by both site 1A and site 1B.
The remaining 2 = 1   1 consumers are type 2 consumers and can potentially have their
needs met only by site 2. Suppose that the sponsored link list contains two rms (M = 2).
Assume that the qualities are independent draws from a uniform distribution on [0;1].
Intuitively, in such a model conducting a weighted auction instead of an unweighted
auction has two eects. First, regardless of whether the weights favor sites 1A and 1B
or site 2, weighting reduces the average quality of the listed sites. Second, increasing
(decreasing) the weight of site 2 makes it more (less) likely that site 2 will appear on the
list. When 1 is very large, it is advantageous to have both sites 1A and 1B on the list for
same reason as in the standard click-weighting model. When 1 is only slightly larger than
2, however, there is a benet to having a diverse list: when site 1A is rst on the list and
sites 1B and site 2 are of equal quality, the incremental benet from including site 1B is
smaller than the incremental benet including site 2 because some of site 1B's potential
consumers will have had their needs met by site 1A.
This model gets complicated, so we again simplify the analysis by considering the special
case in which consumers have s  0, so that clicks decline at lower positions only because
needs are being met and not also because of quality-inferences.
In this environment, consider a weighted k + 1st price ascending bid auction in which
winning bidders are chosen by comparing b1A, b1B, and wb2.40 We focus on the case of
w  1 to discuss when favoring rm 2 is better than equal weighting.
Again, each rm i will bid up to qi to be included on the two-rm list. Once the bidding
is down to two rms, however, equilibrium bidding will produce a slightly dierent outcome
from the unweighted model of section 4. If rms 1A and 1B are on the list, there will again
40As in section 6.1, the bi are per-click bids and the per-click payment of rm k is the k +1
st highest bid
adjusted for the weight dierence (if a dierence exists).
38be an equilibrium with full sorting. When rms 1x and 2 are on the list, however, there
cannot be an equilibrium with full sorting. Because demand is independent of the expected
quality of each site (due to the simplifying assumption that s  0 for all consumers and
the fact that customers served by the two sites are distinct), both rms will drop out
immediately.
Given these bidding strategies, suppose that rm 1A is rst on the list and the weight
w is pivotal in determining which other rm appears, i.e. q1B = wq2. Having rm 1B also
on the list provides incremental utility only to type 1 buyers whose needs were not met by
rm 1A. Hence, the expected incremental value of including rm 1B (conditional on q1A) is
1(1 q1A)E(q1Bjq1B < q1A;q1B = wq2) = 1(1 q1A)q1A=2:41 Including rm 2 can provide
incremental utility to any type 2 buyer: the incremental benet is (1   1)E(q2jq1B <
q1A;q1B = wq2) = (1   1)q1A=2w: Using w > 1 will provide greater consumer surplus
than w = 1 if the second term is greater than the rst (in expectation) when w = 1. The
distribution of q1A conditional on q1A being the largest of the three and the other two
satisfying q1B = wq2 is just the distribution of the larger of two uniform [0;1] random
variables. This implies that the conditional expectation of q1A is 2/3 and the conditional
expectation of q2
1A = 1=2. Hence, there is a gain in consumer surplus from choosing w > 1
if 1(1=3   1=4) < (1   1)1=3. We have
Proposition 15 The consumer-surplus maximizing weighted auction is one that favors
diversity of the listings (w > 1) if 1 < 4=5.
Proof: A formal proof is given in the Appendix.
The proof in the appendix includes an explicit formula for consumer surplus that could
be maximized over w to nd the optimal weight for particular values of 1.
Note that the sense in which diversity is favored in this proposition is quite strong. The
diversity-providing link is favored in an absolute sense, not just relative to the fraction of
consumers for which it is of interest.
To implement diversity-favoring weights, a search engine would need to infer which
sponsored links contributed to the diversity of a set of oerings. One way to do this
might be to estimate contributions to diversity by looking at whether the likelihood that
a particular consumer clicks on a particular site is positively or negatively correlated with
whether that consumer clicked on each other site.
41Conditioning on q1B = wq2 is irrelevant because conditional on wq2 < q1A, wq2 is uniform on [0;q1A].
39What is meant by \standard" click-weighting is not obvious in models like this. One
description of the click-weighted auction one sees in the literature is the weight used is
the estimated CTR conditional on the rm being rst on the list. In the example above,
the CTR's for rms 1A, 1B, and 2 conditional on being rst on the list are 1, 1, and
2, respectively so these standard weights would favor rms 1A and 1B for any 1 > 1=2.
CTR's could also be estimated using an average of observed CTR's from when a rm is in
the rst and second positions. This would still favor rm 2 for a smaller range of 1 than
is optimal, however, because the optimal weights are entirely based on CTR's when rms
are in the second position.
6.6 What does click-weighting mean?
The question of what is meant by the \standard" click-weight is of broader importance.
In the model of section 6.1, the click-weights were assumed to be the (known) parameters
. In practice, click weights will be estimated from data on click-throughs as a function
of rankings. When the relationship between clicks and rankings is not a known function
independent of other website attributes it is not clear what these will mean.
One interesting example is our base model. In this model, suppose that click-through
rates are estimated via some regression estimated on data obtained when dierent subsets
of rms randomly choose to compete on dierent days. Suppose that each website has the
same q across days. In this situation, the the clicks that a given site gets when it is in the
kth position is a decreasing function of its quality. Conditional on k, the quality of sites
1;2;:::;k   1 is higher when qk:N is higher. Hence, the likelihood that consumers will get
down to the kth position without satifying their need is lower.
Using click-weights like this will tend to disadvantage higher-quality sites, reducing both
the average quality of the set of sites presented and eliminating the sorting property of our
base model.
7 More auction design
7.1 Search-diverting Sites
In the U.S. market three main rms provide search services and sell keyword advertising:
Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft.42 Google is substantially larger than the others and earns
higher revenue per search. When keyword searches are performed on each of these search
42The fourth largest search engine, Ask.com, displays ads provided by Google.
40engines, particularly on Microsoft and Yahoo!, sponsored link slots are not infrequently
occupied by sites like Nextag, Shopzilla, Bizrate, Smarter, Shopping, Cataloglink, and
Coupon Mountain. These sites provide some search and shopping comparison services,
but also earn revenues simply by prominently posting lists of sponsored links provided by
Google. We refer to them collectively as search-diverting sites.
Under particular assumptions, this could be an ecient way for Microsoft and Yahoo!
to monetize their searches in light of Google's technology and scale advantages. Suppose
that Google pays 100% of the revenues generated by these sponsored links to the search-
diverting sites. Suppose that all consumers who click on a search-diverting site continue
their search on the list of sponsored links provided there exactly as they would on Google
itself. Suppose also that consumers recognize that all search-diverting sites provide exactly
the same list, and hence won't click on a second site of this variety.43 Then, each of the
search-diverting sites would be willing to bid up to Google's total expected revenue for the
opportunity to be in the rst position. Even though consumers usually just click on the
rst search diverting ad and never return to the search engine they started from, Microsoft
and Yahoo! would receive the full Google revenues from this single click.
Under other assumptions, however, the presence of these search-diverting sites could
reduce search-engine prots and welfare. Here is a simple example. Suppose that all
sponsored link lists contain M places and there are N > M advertisers bidding for a
particular keyword on Google. Suppose that N +1 rms are bidding for the same keyword
on Yahoo!/Microsoft: the same N rms bidding on Google plus an N+1st \search-diverting"
rm that displays Google's sponsored link list and receives a share  < 1 of all revenues
that Google receives from clicks on this list. Suppose that consumers are unaware of this
asymmetry and therefore click on any ads in Yahoo!/Microsoft in the order in which they
are listed.44 Once they click on the search-diverting ad, however, assume that they realize
that it is providing a sponsored link list generated by N rms bidding against each other.
As long as the revenue share  is not too small, the equilibrium of this model will have
the search diverting rm in the rst position. It gets a fraction  of Google's revenues from
all clicks that take place, whereas the benet to the highest q regular advertiser from being
listed rst ahead of the search-diverting rm is just the increment in clicks that derives
43This somewhat awkward assumption is necessary to allow Bertrand competition between identical search
diverters. Otherwise, search diverters would be unwilling to bid any positive per-click amount for a position
below another search diverter { consumers will already have seen the links displayed by the second search
diverter and hence the second search diverter will earn no revenue.
44Suppose also that their beliefs about quality before clicking on the links are as in our base model with
N + 1 rms.
41from being thought to be rst of N + 1 rms (which is the belief if it comes top on the
Yahoo!/Microsoft list) relative to being rst of N rms (which is the belief that consumers
have after seing it on the Google list that the search-diverting rm presents).
Indeed, the model has an equilibrium in which all regular advertisers drop out at the
reservation price because consumers will see their ad on the Google list and hence they get
no incremental sales from clicks on their Yahoo!/Microsoft list.
Consumer surplus is reduced slightly by the presence of the search-diverting rm because
consumers have to make one extra click to begin the search process. Search engine prot is
reduced because because the search-engine only gets the search-diverting rm's bid, which
is less than its revenue, which is a fraction  of the revenue that would have been obtained
if the N regular advertisers were the only bidders.45
7.2 Ad relevance and consumer inference about search engine quality
Another dimension in which search engines dier is in their tolerance for irrelevant ads.
Google often presents no ads for certain types of queries (such as the names of ordinary
people), whereas Microsoft presents more non-specic ads such as ads for ringtones, eBay,
or Amazon. One way to think of such policies would be to regard them as similar to
reserve prices. In this section, we note that an additional way would be to add consumer
uncertainty as to the relevance of links to the model.
To model this, suppose the distribution of qi is either U[0;1] with probability  (relevance
probability) or degenerate at zero with probability 1   . So either there is a distribution
of probabilities of matches, or it is certain that no rm oers a match.46 Consumers will
then update both with respect to ad quality and with respect to whether the set of ads
presented is relevant or irrelevant as they move down the list.
Given this model, we have
Pr






z1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0jqi  U[0;1]











N+j + (1   )
:
45See Gunawardana et al. (2008) for more on search diversion.
46This formulation does not provide a motivation for advertisers to provide non-specic advertisements.
Some rms appear to advertise with the strategy of attracting consumers who were not looking for their
products (e.g. ringtone companies, who historically were major advertisers on several search engines and
seemed to specialize in unrelated search terms such as common rst names), or one could also add a benet
independent of meeting consumers' needs, as in a company that is interested in advertising its name rather
than generating a lead.
42Consumers' expectations about the quality of the kth sponsored link conditional on
reaching it are:
E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0;qi  U[0;1])Pr

qi  U[0;1]jz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0

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N+j + (1   )
:
Some obervations from these formula are:
1. Holding N and k xed, Pr
 
qi  U[0;1]jz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0

is increasing and convex
in . When k is large, even a small decrease in  away from 1 can lead to a large
decrease in beliefs about the quality of the kth site. If  is not close to one then most
consumers will only click on a small number of ads.
2. Holding N and  xed, Pr
 
qi  U[0;1]jz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0

is decreasing and convex
in k. When N is large, a consumer's posterior belief in relevance drops dramatically
after failing to have his or her needs met at the rst site.
The implications of this analysis for policy are that welfare can be hurt directly and
indirectly by allowing irrelevant links onto the search page. First, consumers waste search
costs when they click on irrelevant ads. Second, the optimal response to the irrelevant ads
is for many fewer consumers to search, which reduces welfare of all parties.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have integrated a model of consumer search into a model of auctions for
sponsored-link advertising slots. General observations from previous papers about the form
of the auction equilibrium are not much aected by this extension: advertisers bid up to
their true value to be included in the sponsored-link list and then shade their bids when
competing for a higher rank.
The dierences in the auction environment does, however, have a number of dierent
implications for auction design. One of these is that reserve prices can increase both search-
engine revenues and consumer surplus. The rationality of consumer search creates a strong
alignment between consumer surplus and social welfare in our model and a consumer-
surplus maximizing search engine will have a strong incentive to screen out ads so that
consumers don't lose utility clicking on them. Another set of dierent implications arise
when we consider click-through weighting. Here, the auction that is ecient with no search
43costs ceases to be ecient for two reasons: it may select the wrong rms and it may provide
consumers with little information to guide their searches. The informational ineciency
can be avoided with an alternate auction mechanism. An additional worry about click-
weighted auctions is obfuscation { since advertisers' steady-state payments do not vary
with their click-through rate (they are determined by the revenue bid of the bidder in the
next-lower position), advertisers have no incentive to design ad text to help consumers avoid
unnecessary clicks.
A more basic theme of our paper is that sponsored link auctions create surplus by
providing consumers with information about the quality of sponsored links which allows
consumers to search more eciently. Sorting rms on the basis of their click-weighted bids
is part of this, but in principle one could imagine many other search engine designs that
produce dierent sets of sponsored links and/or present consumers with information in
other ways. This should be an interesting area for pure and applied research.47
47See Rayo and Segal (2008) for one interesting approach to the more abstract question of how consumers
might be provided with information on advertiser quality.
44Appendix
Proofs of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1: When F is uniform, fk:N(x) = N!
(N k)!(k 1)!(1 x)k 1xN k.
Then the two probabilities from the previous expression are:














Note that both the numerator and the denominator in the expression we're evaluating are
equal to a constant times an integral of the form
R 1
0 xa(1 x)bdx: Integrating by parts one
can show that this is equal to a!b!=(a + b + 1)!. Evaluating the integrals gives the proof of
Lemma 1.
The second part of Lemma 1 can also be proved more quickly by noting that





1   E(qj:Njz1 = :::zj 1 = 0)

The consumer will want to search the kth website if (N + 1   k)=(N + k) > s. This
holds for k < kmax(s).
QED
Proof of Proposition 4
First, we show by induction on k that the specied strategies are dierentiable and
strictly monotone increasing in q and satisfy b(k;bk+1;q)  q on the equilibrium path. For
k = M + 1 this is immediate from b(M + 1;0;q) = q. If it holds for some K > 2 then for
any bK faced by a type q bidder on the equilibrium path we have







 bK + (q   bK) = q:
The inequality here follows from two observations: q bK > 0; and the term in parentheses
is between 0 and 1. (The rst of these follows from the inductive hypothesis via q   bK 
qK:N bK  0 and the second comes from 1 q < 1,  qK 1 <  qK 2, and G strictly monotone.)
To see that the bidding function is dierentiable and strictly monotone increasing in q, one
can compute the derivative and see that it is positive. (The inductive hypothesis is again
used here via q   bK  0:)
We now show that the bidding functions are a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. By the
single-stage deviation principle, it suces to show that no single-stage deviation can increase
the prot of a player i of type qi. We do this by another inductive argument. We rst show
that this is true of deviations in the nal stage (k = 2). And we then show that the
nonexistence of protable deviations at all later stages (all k0 < k) implies that there is also
no protable single stage deviation at stage k.
45Consider the nal stage of the game. Suppose rm i has quality qi and that b3 =
b(3;b4;q) so that rm i's belief is that the other active rm has qj  Fjq>q: Firm i's
expected payo as a function of its dropout point ^ q can be written as 1
1 F(q)(qi; ^ q) where
(qi; ^ q) =
 Z ^ q
q
G( q1)(qi   b(3;b3;q))f(q)dq +
Z 1
^ q
G( q2)(1   q)(qi   b3)f(q)dq
!
:
To show that this is maximized at ^ q = qi it suces to show that (qi;qi)   (qi; ^ q)  0 for
all ^ q.
For ^ q  qi we have




G( q1)(qi   b(3;b3;q))   G( q2)(1   q)(qi   b3)

f(q)dq:
To show that this is nonnegative it suces to show that
G( q1)(qi   b(3;b3;q))  G( q2)(1   q)(qi   b3)
for all q 2 [^ q;qi]. Because the bidding functions are dierentiable and strictly monotone
increasing in q, the argument in the text before the proposition applies and therefore for
each q in this interval the local indierence condition holds:
G( q1)(q   b(3;b3;q)) = G( q2)(1   q)(q   b3)
Subtracting the two equations we nd that it suces to show
G( q1)(qi   q)  G( q2)(1   q)(qi   q):
This is indeed satised for all q 2 [^ q;qi] because G( q1) > G( q2) and (1   q) < 1. The
argument for ^ q > qi is virtually identical. Together, these two cases establish that there is
no protable single-stage deviation in the nal stage.
Suppose now that there are no protable deviations from the given strategies in stages
2;3;:::;k   1 and consider a stage k history with bk+1 = b(k + 1;bk+2;q). To show
that there is no protable single stage deviation, we'll consider separately deviations to
^ b > b(k;bk+1;qi) and deviations to ^ b < b(k;bk+1;qi).
The rst case is quite similar to the argument for k = 2. Deviating to ^ b > b(k;bk+1;qi)
makes no dierence unless player i is eliminated in stage k when he bids b(k;bk+1;qi) and
is not eliminated when he bids ^ b. Hence for all relevant realizations of the k   1st highest
quality, player i will be the rst to drop out in stage k 1 if he then follows the equilibrium





(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)(1   q)jqk 1:N = q







(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)jqk 1:N = q

G( qk 1)(qi b(k;bk+1;q))f(q)dq;
46where ^ q is the solution to b(k;bk+1; ^ q) = ^ b. (A solution to this exists because the bidding
functions are dierentiable and approach 1 in the limit as q ! 1.) As above, this will be
nonnegative if
(1   q)G( qk)(qi   bk+1)  G( qk 1)(qi   b(k;bk+1;q))
for all q 2 [qi; ^ q]. Subtracting the local indierence condition from the two sides of this
equation we again obtain that a sucient condition is
(1   q)G( qk)(qi   q)  G( qk 1)(qi   q) 8q 2 [qi; ^ q]:
This will hold because qi   q < 0 and 0 < (1   q)G( qk) < G( qk 1):
The argument for deviations to ^ b < b(k;bk+1;qi) is just a little more complicated. In
this case, the deviation makes no dierence unless player i is eliminated in stage k when
he bids ^ b and is not eliminated at this stage when he bids b(k;bk+1;qi). We show that
the change in payo is not positive by a two-step argument: we show that that the payo
from dropping out at ^ b is worse than the payo from bidding b(k;bk+1;qi) at stage k and
then dropping out immediately in stage k   1; and that this in turn is less than the payo
from bidding b(k;bk+1;qi) at stage k and then following the given strategies. The latter














(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)(1   q)jqk 1:N = q

G( qk)(qi bk+1)f(q)dq
is nonnegative where ^ q < qi is the solution to b(k;bk+1; ^ q) = ^ b. This is just like the
argument for the ^ q  qi case above. The expresion is nonnegative if
G( qk 1)(qi   b(k;bk+1;q))  (1   q)G( qk)(qi   bk+1)
for all q 2 [^ q;qi]. Subtracting the local indierence condition from the two sides of this
equation we again obtain that a sucient condition is
G( qk 1)(qi   q)  (1   q)G( qk)(qi   q) 8q 2 [^ q;qi]:
This will hold because qi   q > 0 and 0 < (1   q)G( qk) < G( qk 1):
This completes the proof that there is no protable deviation at stage k and the result
follows by induction.
QED
Proof of Proposition 5: The rst expression is derived by noting that the rm will
receive a click only if all higher rms do not meet the consumer's need and the consumer
will decide to click on site k if he or she gets that far. The probability that site j will be
unsuccessful for the consumer conditioning on qj > q is 1 E(qjjqj > q) = (1+q)=2.48 The
48Note that the j in this expression is a generic index and does not denote the j
th highest value.
47probability that all k  1 clicks will be unsuccessful is ((1+ q)=2)k 1. The probability that
the consumer will click on the kth site is
Probfs < E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0)g = E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0)
= (N + 1   k)=(N + k)
by Lemma 1.
The second expression is simply the expression for Probfz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0g in Lemma
1 multiplied by the consumer's conditional expectation for qk:N.
QED
Additional Details on the Proof of Proposition 10
With no reserve price, consumers with search costs in [2
3   ; 2
3] will click only on the

















Suppose now that the search engine uses a small positive reserve price r. (More precisely
assume r 2 (0; 1
3   2)). These consumers now click on the rst link only if two links are
displayed. Per consumer social welfare becomes





































For somewhat larger r, specically r 2 [1
3   2; 5
9   4
3], consumers in the high search
cost group will click on the top link even if only one link is displayed. In the high search
cost population per-consumer welfare is now
W = (2E(q1:Njq2:N  r)   s)(1   r)2 + (2E(q1:Njq1:N > r;q2:N < r)2r(1   r):
Using this, we one can show that the per consumer welfare gain in the high-search cost
subpopulation is at most 2
3r2(1 2r). This is negative for r > 1
2 and is uniformly bounded
above by 2
81. Computing the mass of needs that go unmet because of the reserve price that
would have been met without a reserve price we nd that the per consumer loss in welfare




4 ) 22. It is easy
to choose 1 and 3 so that this outweighs any gains in the high-search costs population
whenever r  1
3   2.
For even larger r the high search cost consumers will be willing to search both sites
when two are listed. But again, one can show that the welfare losses in the low search cost
population will outweigh this.
48QED
Proof of Proposition 15
To compute expected consumer surplus we compute the probability that each subset of
rms is listed and the expected quality of the listed rms conditional on that subset being
selected. Write L for the set of rms listed. The main probability fact we need is easy:
ProbfL = f1A;1Bgg = 1=3w
To see this, note that L = f1A;1Bg is possible only if q2 2 [0;1=w]. This happens with
probability 1=w conditional on q2 being in this range, L = f1A;1Bg occurs with probability
1/3 (because wq2 is then uniformly distributed on [0;1]).
The expected qualities are
E(q1xjL = f1A;1Bg;q1x > q1y) =
3
4
E(q1xjL = f1A;1Bg;q1x < q1y) =
1
2
E(q1xjL = f1x;2g) =
8w   3
12w   4
E(q2jL = f1x;2g) =
6w2   1
12w2   4w
The rst two are again identical to the formulas for the unweighted case because this L
only arises when q2 2 [0;1=w] and in this event wq2 is uniformly distributed on [0;1]. The
latter two formulas can be derived fairly easily by conditioning separately on values with
q2 2 [0;1=w] and values with q2 2 [1=w;1]. For example,
E(q1xjL = f1x;2g) =
Prfq2 2 [ 1
w;1]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [ 1
w;1]gE(q1xjL = f1x;2g;q2 2 [ 1
w;1])
+Prfq2 2 [0; 1
w]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [0; 1
w]gE(q1xjL = f1x;2g;q2 2 [0; 1
w])
Prfq2 2 [ 1
w;1]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [ 1
w;1]g
+Prfq2 2 [0; 1
w]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [0; 1
w]g
=
(1   1=w)(1=2)(2=3) + (1=w)(1=3)(5=8)
(1   1=w)(1=2) + (1=w)(1=3)



































The dierence between this expression and the expected consumer surplus from an un-
weighted auction can be put in a relatively simple form by grouping terms corresponding
to cases when the list is unaected by the changes in weights and cases when it is aected.
49We nd















































Writing f1(w), f2(w) and g3(w)h3(w) for the three lines of this expression note that all
three terms are equal to zero at w = 1. f2(w) is identically zero. The derivative of the
third evaluated at w = 1 is just dg3=dwjw=1h3(1): After these simplications it takes just







This implies that some w > 1 provides greater consumer surplus than w = 1 provided
that  < 4=5. To complete the proof, we should also work out the equations for consumer
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